Technology Base. Big Projects vs. Little Projects. Attention to Detail. Resilience of Space Transportation System. Goals and Affordability.
Program Content:. Personnel Resources. Biographies of Members. Terms of Reference. Legal Compliance. List of Witnesses. Figure 1. Figure 2. The Committee believes that, given the benefits it provides for the future of this country, the nation's civil space program should receive funding support of this general magnitude.
If the program cannot receive support from the Administration and Congress at this level, then the achievement of goals of the manned exploration program should be delayed, and the magnitude of the Mission to Planet Earth reduced. Continuing to strive for ambitious goals with inadequate resources will only lead to continuing overcommitment. The Committee suggests, therefore, that unless resources on the order of 10 percent real growth, eventually reaching about 0.
More importantly, however, the Committee believes that the progress of any program with the ultimate, long-term objective of human exploration of Mars should be tailored to the availability of funding -- and not to some fixed date for accomplishment. This is not only because we cannot exactly predict costs, or the rate of progress of the revolutionary technology that will be required, but because we must ultimately limit the risk to pioneering astronauts.
Clearly, their safety is of greater concern than meeting any challenging, but in truth arbitrary, schedule. For purposes of assessment, the civil space program can be categorized into space science, Mission to Planet Earth, Mission from Planet Earth, technology and launch systems. The following address these topics. Space Science. American scientists and engineers have used opportunities for access to space to advance human understanding of ourselves, our planet, our solar system, and our universe -- from the discovery of the Van Allen belts to the establishment of X-ray astronomy, from the high resolution photos of the planets, their satellites, and rings to the global weather monitoring and forecasting system, from the growth in a microgravity environment of very large crystals to the age-dating of the Moon with lunar samples, from the detailed mapping of the Earth's polar ozone depletions to the precise measurement of the "Big Bang" residual radiation, from the discovery of the effects of microgravity on bone growth and healing in mammals to direct measurements of million-degree solar system plasmas, and from the discovery of the enigmatic, rare repeating gamma ray bursters to the finding of ancient and active volcanoes on other planets and satellites.
These achievements and the understanding gained from them will continue to be one of the most significant products of the nation's investment in the civil space program. The cost of this effort in recent years, has been on the order of 20 percent of NASA's budget Figure 7. With so spectacular a set of achievements as a foundation, and with a substantial number of space projects underway, the U.
Yet discussions with researchers within NASA and in the university community reveal that there is significant discontent and unease about what the future may hold for U. They include such factors as a the widening of research horizons in response to past accomplishments so that there are now more opportunities than can be accommodated by the available resources; b the space technology required to support new advances is often more costly and sophisticated than in the past; c the growing complexity of interactions between NASA and its larger and more diverse research community; and d program stretch-outs, delays and cancellations that waste creative researchers time, squander resources, and decrease flight opportunities.
We believe that many of these reasons continue to exist. An underlying basis for the concern of the research community has been that the strategies, goals, objectives, and programmatic requirements of the research program have not been adequately distinguished from the parallel national objective of placing humans in space. Mechanisms are needed which alleviate the more serious of these problems so that the talents and capabilities of America's space researchers, both inside and outside of NASA, can be focused on substantive future opportunities.
We strongly affirm the central role of research in the U. We note that this recommendation carries with it the responsibility for the research community and NASA to use these resources in a prudent manner to carry out pioneering research. To do this, the research community must understand and appreciate, as well as participate in, the planning and budgetary process.
To facilitate execution of this recommendation, we propose The present strategic plan provides appropriate balance to the research program that must be maintained across the disciplines, as well as across the methodologies for carrying out the research. In particular, an appropriate mix must be achieved among small, medium, and large projects. A trend toward the development of large projects has developed in recent years, driven by several factors.
These include the natural evolution in requirements of some research fields and the "new start" process employed by NASA, the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress for initiating projects to carry out research. This latter process sometimes encourages a "piling-on" of research objectives, as well as of researchers, in order to strengthen fiscal justification.
An environment needs to be created that will encourage small, fast-paced projects as well as large projects and enable both to flourish. Research support activities, such as mission operations and data analysis programs, as well as many portions of the advanced technology development program, represent the life blood of civil space research.
These activities, together with sub-orbital balloon and rocket projects, are the centerpiece of university professor and student involvement with the civil space program. Such activities encourage substantial numbers of scientists and engineers, beyond those involved in hardware development for major space flight projects, to participate constructively and creatively in the space program.
We conclude, therefore, that Research and Analysis Programs, Mission Operations and Data Analysis Programs, and the Advanced Technology Development Programs should be viewed as equally essential to the overall research program as are hardware projects themselves; that a "fast track" procurement process be devised for such programs; and that the resources allocated to these support activities not be used as "contingency" resources for unexpected problems encountered on large flight projects.
We view the overall management of the research program to be a key part of the responsibilities of NASA headquarters, and consider that the portion of this activity aimed at the outside research and engineering community can be strengthened. Such strengthening includes a reappraisal of the balance between work performed in academia and that performed within NASA itself.
At present, the process that allocates and transfers resources to non-NASA institutions can cause the university community to be at a disadvantage with respect to NASA center researchers and center-funded contractors, the later sometimes having "umbrella" type contracts for research support to the centers. We urge that universities, other organizations, and their investigator teams be used increasingly as "prime" contractors for space research instruments and projects.
We recognize that the implementation of this recommendation will vary from one research discipline to another, as well as from project to project. But we submit that its implementation will considerably lessen the reporting burdens now required of researchers, will relieve NASA personnel of certain routine contract coordination functions, and will place the responsibility for the ultimate success of programs that fall into this category where it should be: squarely with the investigator team.
Mission to Planet Earth. The mission promises a major step in the development of the science and technology of global remote sensing of our planet.
The data that will be collected in the program are essential for documenting, understanding, and predicting global change. The enormous benefits of this information to society require that NASA ensure that the program is well designed and efficiently managed.
Interagency and international contributions and cooperation will be key factors in the success of the program. Data management is of critical importance, as with most space programs. Global Change Research Program was reviewed by the National Research Council in early and found to be generally consistent with the scientific requirements of that program. However, the review also notes several issues that remain to be addressed. The Committee also emphasizes the importance of adequate funding for the evolution and operation of the EOS data and information system.
As regards design of the Earth Observing System, the Committee supports the concept of simultaneous flight of instruments to address natural processes occurring on short time scales, and to facilitate intercalibration and environmental corrections.
This approach leads to the requirement for a large spacecraft -- which is less costly on a per instrument basis. NASA has thus proposed two series of relatively large platforms in polar orbit to implement EOS over a year period.
The NRC report mentioned above generally supports the concept of simultaneity for a group of instruments, the accompanying need for at least one large spacecraft, and the general concept of long-term measurements. But the report also notes that many objectives could perhaps be achieved better and sooner with a series of smaller, independent satellites.
Moreover, the Committee notes that the perception remains in the scientific community that the current proposal for a fixed configuration of two relatively large polar platforms may not be ideal for answering important questions yet to be clearly posed.
Furthermore, compromises have to be made when many instruments fly on the same platform, and failures can lead to massive loss of data. Continuity and reliability of the data stream also are key factors for understanding global change, as is the considerable contribution of non-U. Earth-observing activities. The Committee sees no reason to disagree with the NRC report, and concludes that the design of EOS must involve a variety of different spacecraft to meet so complex a set of requirements.
In the end, a combination of different size spacecraft and surface-based platforms will be needed. Alternative approaches should be carefully examined so that the optimum approach can be selected to meet scientific objectives with continuity, reliability, and affordability. Particular diligence will be required to assure that the complexity of EOS is controlled. NASA's coordination with these ongoing programs is an essential element of the civil space program.
The Committee recognizes that NASA's charter includes the development of new space capabilities, including remote sensing systems for environmental monitoring, but notes that NASA's role in the research and development for operational environmental satellites has diminished in recent years. In our view, this trend should be reversed.
We note that EOS and other components of Mission to Planet Earth can serve as a valuable testing ground for pre- operational instruments. Thus The Earth Observing System combines the characteristics of research and operational missions. The overall importance of the program to the nation and its dual character taken together enforce the need for high-level management attention.
Moreover, considering that EOS will be the centerpiece, at least in terms of resources, for the U. Global Change Research Program, it is essential that the planning and decision making process encompass the full range of relevant agencies and the federal Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences CEES.
The large size, broad scope and national importance of the program also suggest that the EOS funding be provided as a line item, separate from other science programs.
This overall undertaking demands continued attention at the policy level by the National Space Council. The Committee believes that a review of the decision-making process for Mission to Planet Earth, including its relation to the U. The review should consider interagency aspects, the role of the CEES, and international dimensions, and make recommendations aimed at ensuring the success and continuity of the program.
It has been proposed to the Committee that the current civil operational satellites, including NOAA environmental satellites and Landsat, could be operated more efficiently and cost-effectively if aggregated under a single commercial entity especially when considered on a global basis.
In this case, the federal government would access the data it requires and carry out the needed research and development, rather than actually operating the satellites.
The international dimension is of clear interest in that it might be possible to develop an international consortium for remote sensing similar to Intelsat or Inmarsat. Consequently, the Committee urges that the National Space Council, together with OSTP and OMB, undertake a feasibility study to determine if a single commercial entity could provide more cost-effective management for operational environmental and land remote-sensing satellites.
The prospects for an international consortium should be evaluated. NASA's experimental Landsat program was transferred to the Commerce Department in with the expectation that the operation could be commercialized profitably. Virtually all parties to that expectation now agree, and international experiences verify, that full commercialization of Landsat is not feasible for the foreseeable future.
Moreover, the funding required to sustain the transfer has been subject to an annual threat of termination. Action must be taken to remedy this problem, or the U. Mission from Planet Earth. On July 20, , the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon landing, President Bush proposed that the nation commit to a "sustained program of manned exploration of the solar system," thereby initiating what has come to be called the Space Exploration Initiative SEI.
In his remarks, the President recognized the Apollo program and all those who contributed to it, but also noted the transient nature of that program and the necessity not to be constrained to "brief encounters" in our future space exploration activities. Thus, the Space Exploration Initiative consists of robotic missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as the establishment of permanent outposts not necessarily continuously inhabited on the Moon and, later, human exploration of Mars.
At some point, it will be necessary to set a specific date for the return to the Moon and, later, for the initial Mars landing. We believe that such a date can best be established at some future time.
There is much planning yet to be done, enabling technologies be developed, key questions to be answered in the area of life sciences, and funding constraints to address.
The question might then be asked: "If there is no timetable for the Mars landing, why is it necessary to establish a program and a set of goals at all? First, any large organization, such as NASA, generally works best when it has an overarching and challenging objective to guide its long-term future. This provides a focus and rationale for the large series of otherwise somewhat disconnected technological efforts which not only enable the eventual program, but also offer the resulting developments to all of our nation's space and non-space activities.
Further, the existence of a long-term and evident goal helps make real the work of researchers and technologists -- not to mention helping motivate talented young men and women to join NASA. It is possible, of course, to conceive of a space program without a long- term vision such as the human exploration of Mars; significant science would still be accomplished and the Earth's environment would still be monitored.
But we would lose the jewel represented by the vision of a seemingly unattainable goal, the technologies engendered, and the motivation provided to our nation's scientists and engineers, its laboratories and industries, its students and its citizens. Hence To respond to this long-range exploration challenge, NASA must establish the framework within which to develop at least six new technology bases and program elements: 1 a modern economical heavy lift launch vehicle; 2 a life sciences emphasis space station; 3 affordable, evolutionary interplanetary transportation systems; 4 automated lunar and Martian exploration; 5 extraterrestrial resource utilization systems; and 6 reliable closed loop ecological life support systems.
The planning for this undertaking will be a challenge that will require adequate time and, most important, outstanding human resources. Later in this report we suggest that a new position, Associate Administrator for Exploration, be established. This person, supported by his or her on Conceptual Systems Design team, should be responsible for planning, overseeing and integrating the six new technology bases and program elements required to carry out the Mission from Planet Earth.
The first task must be to prepare an evolutionary, flexible long-range plan that starts with 21st Century operations on Mars and works backward to critical initial steps and realistic budgets.
Immediate attention must be given to establishing a vigorous now space life sciences program, and eventually to planning for international participation in the Mission from Planet Earth. Space Station Freedom. We have elected to treat Space Station Freedom as the first step in the Mission from Planet Earth even though it has other valid uses, such as hands-on extended duration microgravity research. The latter may have important impact in the area of competitiveness, potentially unlocking new developments in such fields as materials, electronics and biosciences.
Space Station Freedom has now been in the design and development phase for three years and, if one includes the concept formulation phases, for eight years. Nonetheless, debate continues over its design concept and even its basic purpose. This has been exacerbated by concerns over the ability of the Space Shuttle to support Space Station Freedom.
As of October, , the baseline plan for the initial block of Space Station Freedom required 18 Shuttle launches over roughly a four-year period, plus five logistics launches per year once the station is permanently occupied five flights prior to the completion of the initial block. Aside from its role in life sciences, it does not appear to the Committee that any manned space station can be justified based solely upon the science it enables -- nor has this been claimed in the case of Space Station Freedom.
Microgravity research is a significant and promising field of endeavor, although of unknown potential. It justifies some form of space platform for experimentation, but it is not, of itself, a sufficient justification for a manned space station.
Likewise, we do not find compelling the case that a space station is needed as a transportation node for planetary exploration. First, many promising flight profiles do not appear to require such a node and, second, if they did, the need in our judgment is sufficiently far in the future that we would hardly know today what to ask of such a terminal today. On the other hand, the Committee holds the strong conviction that if the U.
The most significant unknowns remaining in manned exploration reside in the area of life sciences. A manned, near-Earth laboratory is, in our judgment, the sensible place to begin addressing these crucial questions which sooner or later must and will be resolved -- by the U.
The need for the Space Station thus rests squarely upon life sciences experimentation and the development and verification of long duration space operating systems. These, together with its uses for microgravity research and applications are, in our opinion, a more than sufficient justification for a space station.
The Committee would be pleased to meet again in perhaps six months should the NASA Administrator so desire, in order to assist on the implementation process. In the meantime, NASA may wish to seek the assistance of its regular outside advisory group, the NASA Advisory Council, to provide independent and ongoing advice for implementing these findings.
It also proposed an unmanned launch vehicle to replace some space shuttle launches, and a scaled-back redesign of space station Freedom. At a dinner with Vice President Quayle and committee members, Office of Management and Budget director Richard Darman argued that the low priority projects would be eliminated during the budget process.
The committee members decided to change their report. Space science was still given first priority, but the other activities were assigned equal priority behind space science. After discussing the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster the executive summary of the committee's report recommended, "saving the Space Shuttle for those missions requiring human presence.
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